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EN BANC REVIEW, HORROR PLENI, AND THE
RESOLUTION OF PATENT LAW CONFLICTS
William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil*
I. INTRODUCTION
In late 1998, the authors published an article and gave
several speeches explaining how the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit's failure to accord stare deci-
sis effect to its own patent law precedent created a number of
intra-circuit conflicts.' The purpose of the article and
speeches was to identify ways in which the Federal Circuit's
treatment of its own precedent threatened the very uniform-
ity of patent law that Congress sought to foster by creating
the circuit.2 The article and speeches stimulated discussion
among the bench and bar about ways to resolve those con-
flicts and, thereby, increase uniformity and predictability in
* The authors are directors at the Newport Beach, California office of
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk and Rabkin, a Professional Corpora-
tion. Before beginning their law practices, Mr. Rooklidge served as a judicial
clerk for Judge Helen W. Nies, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, and Mr. Weil served as a judicial clerk for Judge
Mary M. Schroeder, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The authors would like to thank Joseph Cianfrani, Janice
Mueller, and Joseph Re for their helpful comments on a draft of this article.
1. See Matthew F. Wel & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The
Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-Making,
80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 791 (1998); William C. Rooklidge, Stare
Un-Decisis: The Decline of Stare Decisis at the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, Address Delivered at the Northwestern School of Law of
Lewis & Clark College Second Annual Conference on Intellectual Property in
the Global Marketplace (Oct. 23, 1998), and at the National Inventors Hall of
Fame Continuing Legal Education Program on Intellectual Property Law Prac-
tice (Sept. 19, 1998); Matthew F. Wel, Stare Un-Decisis: The Sometimes Rough
Treatment of Precedent by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, Address Delivered at the Meeting of the Orange County Patent Law
Association in Costa Mesa, California (Oct. 21, 1998).
2. See Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 1, at 791-94 (citing S. REP. No. 97-
275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A-N. 11, § 15).
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patent law. Many members of the bar shared examples of,
and concerns about, conflicts in the Federal Circuit's patent
law precedent. Indeed, one member of the Federal Circuit it-
self addressed the concerns over the conflicts. In a series of
frank and thoughtful speeches to California patent law or-
ganizations during January of 1999, Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa,
Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, addressed the issue of conflicts at the Federal
Circuit.
3
In his speeches, Judge Gajarsa conceded that conflicts
exist in the Federal Circuit's patent law,4 recognized the diffi-
culty those conflicts cause the patent bar and its clients, and
suggested that the court and the bar work together in a part-
nership to resolve those conflicts.5 Judge Gajarsa devoted
3. See Arthur J. Gajarsa, Conflicts at the Federal Circuit, Address to the
San Diego Intellectual Property Law Association (Jan. 14, 1999), to the Orange
County Patent Law Association (Jan. 15, 1999), and to the Los Angeles Intellec-
tual Property Law Association (Jan. 16, 1999).
4. See id. The examples that Judge Gajarsa cited relate to several matters
not touched upon in this article. First, Judge Gajarsa addressed the standard of
review for factual determinations in preliminary injunctions against patent in-
fringement. Compare Smith Intl, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (seriously misjudged the evidence), with New Eng. Braiding Co.
v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (clearly erroneous).
Second, Gajarsa discussed the nature of the issue of equivalence under 35
U.S.C. § 112, 1 6. Compare Intel v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d
821, 841 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (factual issue), with Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
138 F.3d 1448, 1457 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (declining to decide whether
it was an issue of law or of fact). Third, Gajarsa addressed the circuit's inter-
pretation of apparently unambiguous statutory terms. Compare In re Alappat,
33 F.3d 1526, 1584 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Schall, J., dissenting) ("We assume that
the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used.") (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986)), with Nike,
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 138 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (court can con-
sider extrinsic evidence "to determine whether ambiguity has invaded an ap-
parently clear text"). Fourth, Judge Gajarsa discussed the perspective from
which prosecution history estoppel is analyzed. Compare Litton Sys. v. Honey-
well, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (perspective of person of ordi-
nary skill in the art), with Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1457 (perspective of competitor).
Finally, Gajarsa addressed the level of identity required to establish statutory
or "same invention"-type double patenting. Compare Studiengesellschaft Kohle
mbH v. Northern Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351, 355 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("By
'same invention' we mean identical subject matter.") (quoting In re Vogel, 422
F.2d 438, 441 (C.C.P.A. 1970)), with In re Lonardo, 119 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("[T]he phrase 'same invention' refers to an invention drawn to substan-
tially identical subject matter.").
5. See Gajarsa, supra note 3. Judge Gajarsa is not the first jurist to call for
a partnership between the bench and bar. See Edward D. Re, The Partnership
of Bench and Bar, 16 CATH. LAW. 194 (1970) [hereinafter Re, Partnership of
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particular attention to explaining the process for seeking en
banc6 review of panel opinions, suggesting the bar could im-
prove the chances of obtaining such review by focusing peti-
tions for en bane review on intra-circuit conflicts created or
perpetuated by the panel opinion.7 By identifying and focus-
Bench and Bar].
6. Careful readers may have noted that this spells "en banc with an "e"
rather than an "i," which the authors used in their prior article. The term is
spelled differently by different courts. The Federal Rules used "in banc" until
they were revised in December of 1998 after long consideration. See United
States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 812 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing FED. R. APP. P. 35
(Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment, Sept. 1995)); FED. R. APP. P. 35
(using "en" rather than "in" for the spelling of "en banc"). Before 1999, the Fed-
eral Circuit had more or less doggedly adhered to the formal "in banc spelling.
Now, like many other courts, it has begun to use the spellings interchangeably.
Compare FED. R. APP. P. 35 ("En Banc Determination"), and Midwest Indus.,
Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (dis-
cussing the court's "en bane action), with Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innova-
tions, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the court's "in
banc" action). As "en banc" is now the statutorily correct spelling, that is the
spelling used in this article.
7. See Gajarsa, supra note 3. The Federal Circuit was established in 1982,
in part in an effort by Congress to foster uniformity in the application of the law
of patents. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
No. 11, § 15. Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit by enacting the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. The Act effectively merged two existing Article II
courts, the Court of Claims, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Congress expanded their mandate to give the new court exclusive appellate ju-
risdiction over most cases involving patent issues, as well as a host of other
subjects. See 4 DONALD S. CHIsUM, PATENTS § 11.06[3][e] (1999). The record of
the time reflects three reasons motivating the creation of the new court: (1) re-
lief of the regional circuit courts' appellate workload; (2) the hope that the new
court would bring about greater uniformity in the development and application
of the patent law; and (3) more effective use of existing federal judicial re-
sources. See 4 id. § 11.06[3][i]. To maintain uniformity in the court's jurispru-
dence, a majority of active judges may vote to take a case en banc. See FED.
CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 13(a).
Upon concurrence of the majority of active judges, the court will, for
any appropriate reason, conduct an en banc hearing, rehearing, or
reconsideration. Among the reasons for en banc actions are: (1) ne-
cessity of securing or maintaining uniformity of decisions; (2) in-
volvement of a question of exceptional importance; (3) necessity of
overruling a prior holding of this or a predecessor court expressed in
an opinion having precedential status; or (4) the initiation, continua-
tion, or resolution of a conflict with another circuit.
Id. at 13(b). Because of the Federal Circuit's special jurisdiction, it is unlikely,
though not impossible, that the court's opinions would ever be the source of con-
flicts other than intra-circuit conflicts. Conflicts with another circuit can arise,
however, over questions outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit
(as to which the Federal Circuit either follows its own law or follows the law of
the circuit of the district court from which the appeal was taken). See, e.g.,
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ing on the specific conflict, Judge Gajarsa explained, the bar
could bring the conflict to the attention of the full court, in-
creasing the chance of an en banc resolution of the conflict.8
Judge Gajarsa is certainly correct that a partnership be-
tween the bench and bar is necessary to resolve the intra-
circuit conflicts plaguing patent law. Further, a petition for
en banc review is greatly strengthened when it focuses the
court's attention on a conflict created or perpetuated by a par-
ticular panel's decision. En banc review, however, is not the
only, or even the best, method of addressing conflicts within
the Federal Circuit, in part, because there is such a heavy
cost associated with the en banc procedure. This article ex-
plains why en banc review is perhaps the least efficient way
to avoid or resolve conflicts. Due to this inefficiency, the
resolution of patent law conflicts requires a much more com-
prehensive partnership between the bench and bar.9
The bench and bar partnership proposed by this article
requires consistency, candor, and care from lawyers and
judges at all stages of appellate proceedings. Initially, the
advocate bears the burden of this partnership. In rendering
advice on whether to appeal lower court decisions, the advo-
cate must carefully consider the precedent established by
prior cases. In briefs addressed to three-judge panels, the ad-
vocate must both identify perceived conflicts already existing
in the law and directly confront precedent contrary to his or
her client's position. During oral argument, the advocate
must acknowledge contrary precedent and existing conflicts
in the law. Finally, the advocate must offer reasoned grounds
for distinguishing or favoring one line of precedent over an-
other.
Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(declaring that Federal Circuit law governs determination of when party is
"prevailing" for purposes of cost award, but regional circuit law governs district
court's exercise of discretion).
8. See Gajarsa, supra note 3. Judge Gajarsa is not the first to call for more
en banc action. See Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in Federal Courts: A Pro-
posal for Increasing the Use of En Bane Appellate Review, 54 U. PIT. L. REV.
805 (1993); Roger Andewelt et al., Remarks at the Tenth Annual Federal Cir-
cuit Judicial Conference, in 146 F.R.D. 205, 376 (1992).
9. See Re, Partnership of Bench and Bar, supra note 5, at 204. Judge Re
pointed out that the partnership of the bench and bar should extend throughout
the trial and appellate process. See id.
[Vol. 40790
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Thus, particularly in the initial stages of the appellate
process, the burden of resolving the existing conflicts and
avoiding future conflicts rests as much on the bar as it does
on the bench."0 The advocate's candor regarding conflicts and
dicta not only assists the Federal Circuit in identifying,
avoiding, and resolving conflicts, but enhances that advo-
cate's credibility with the court.
After written briefs and oral arguments, the court takes
over. At that point, the authoring judge must treat precedent
with respect, avoiding unnecessary dicta. Further, the other
judges on the panel must be alert to conflicts missed by the
authoring judge. Finally, all the judges on the panel must
heed the warnings of the circuit's Senior Technical Assistant
and other judges on the court about conflicts identified during
the pre-publication circulation of opinions.
Once an opinion is issued, the responsibility shifts back
to the advocate to focus petitions for rehearing and en banc
review, as Judge Gajarsa suggests, on any conflicts created or
perpetuated by the panel opinion. At this point, conflicts in
the law assume paramount importance in the decision-
making process. The panel should carefully consider any con-
flict identified in a petition for rehearing to avoid involving
the entire court. If the panel does not act, the full Federal
Circuit should consider granting en banc review to resolve
clear conflicts in precedent. Even the denial of en banc re-
view can be salutary. If the apparent conflict in precedent is
not real, the court can explain that fact in the denial of en
bane review. If the court is deadlocked on an issue, separate
opinions identifying the basis of the split serve both as a
warning to the bar and a signal to the Supreme Court that
the Federal Circuit cannot resolve the disagreement without
assistance.
Finally, and as the last resort, where Federal Circuit
precedent is in irreconcilable conflict, the advocate should
seek a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court. Just as
inter-circuit conflicts necessitate Supreme Court review, an
intra-circuit conflict in an area-like patent law-where the
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction, likewise justifies
10. See id. at 205. Judge Re explained that thinking of "the decisional proc-
ess as the sole responsibility of the judge... falls far short of the fact, and does
violence to the cooperative effort that must prevail if the system is to succeed."
Id.
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Supreme Court review.
Following this Introduction, Part II of this article exam-
ines Judge Gajarsa's proposed solution to the problem of in-
tra-circuit conflicts: a bench and bar partnership in the en
banc review process. Part II explains why en banc review is
costly and inefficient, and suggests that en banc review may
not be appropriate for resolving every intra-circuit conflict (let
alone preventing future conflicts). Part III considers a more
extensive bench and bar partnership than the one proposed
by Judge Gajarsa. It identifies the responsibilities of both
judges and attorneys at each step of the appellate process.
Furthermore, Part III stresses that each step of the process
requires both bench and bar effort to resolve prior conflicts
with precedent in the Federal Circuit and to minimize new
conflicts in the future.
The authors of this article advance their suggestions with
some trepidation and more than a little humility. Conflicts
can be, and often are, created unintentionally. Despite any
court's best efforts, conflicts will continue to be a fact of life.
Further, the proposed partnership between bench and bar re-
quires much work on the part of both groups-and clients
may initially view it with some trepidation as well. The part-
nership imposes a considerable burden on the judges of the
Federal Circuit to read all of the patent cases that the Fed-
eral Circuit publishes each year (as well as a good number of
the unpublished dispositions and the many more non-patent
cases the court issues). Advocates shoulder a similar burden,
keeping abreast of recent developments in patent law and
faithfully scouring the circuit's precedent for rulings relevant
to their cases.
These burdens notwithstanding, the efforts urged by this
article will benefit clients, not only in the long run, but in the
short run as well. Moreover, only through this partnership
can the bench and bar efficiently and effectively resolve the
burgeoning conflicts in Federal Circuit patent law. This
resolution ultimately serves the clients' interests by avoiding
unnecessary litigation."
11. Intra-circuit patent law conflicts generate what Karl Llewellyn identi-
fied as a "shift in reckonability of outcome," which "produces appeals based not
on sound judgment but on wild speculation, therefore vastly too many appeals."
KARL N. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 43
(1960). These conflicts hamper the law's ability to serve as "prophecies of what
[Vol. 40
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II. HORROR PLENI: THE AVERSION TO EN BANC REVIEW
In his speeches on the subject of conflicts in the Federal
Circuit, Judge Gajarsa suggested that the bar could influence
the conflict-resolving efforts of the court by focusing on con-
flicts presented by panel opinions when submitting petitions
for en banc review. This suggestion assumes that once a con-
flict is identified, the Federal Circuit will resolve that conflict
en banc. Courts generally are reluctant, however, to under-
take en banc review. This reluctance-termed by one ob-
server "horror pleni"'2 -has several valid bases.
A. En Banc Review Is Inefficient
En banc review can be very costly from an institutional
point of view." En banc review of appeals by a twelve-judge
court like the Federal Circuit "normally take[s] an inordinate
time to schedule, let alone decide. Almost invariably,... they
produce multiple opinions and postpone disposition of the
case for months, sometimes years."14 For twelve judges to re-
hear a case en banc consumes resources that might be more
fruitfully spent on three or four other dispositions by three-
courts will do." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
461 (1897).
12. Horror pleni is, literally, "horror of the Plenum," which LIewellyn de-
fined as "a strong aversion of the members of the German Supreme Court (at
that time consisting of about seventy-five judges) en banc, to settle a conflict be-
tween a prior decision of one Supreme Court panel and the pending case of an-
other." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 12 n.1 (Paul
Gerwitz, ed. 1989).
13. Other courts have adopted ways of overruling precedent without consid-
ering the issue en banc. For example, in the District of Columbia Circuit, a
panel can escape the effect of precedent by circulating its draft opinion to the
full court calling particular attention to the proposed departure from precedent
and, if the full court approves, the panel may publish the opinion (inserting a
so-called "Irons footnote" to inform those who read the opinion that the court
was aware of the apparent conflict). See Douglas Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The
D.C. Circuit Review September 1989-August 1990: The Court En Banc: 1981-
1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1015 (citing Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265,
268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). "In contrast, a panel of the Seventh Circuit may
overrule a circuit precedent if, upon circulation of the proposal, a majority of the
active judges does not object." Id. at 1016. This article does not consider
whether the Federal Circuit should adopt any of these methods, but instead
confines itself to identifying ways to work within the current system. The in-
dispensable first step towards identifying those ways, however, is to recognize
that en banc review is not a panacea for all the conflicts in Federal Circuit pat-
ent law precedent.
14. Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course: The Use of Precedent in the District
of Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 477, 482-83 (1986).
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judge panels. 5 In addition, there are other factors adding to
the overall "transaction cost" associated with en banc proce-
dures. For example, the grant of a petition for rehearing en
banc often provides parties the possibility (and perhaps in-
centive) to settle before resolution of the case (but after ex-
pending considerable judicial resources on the case).16 Moreo-
ver, if the en banc court simply agrees with the panel opinion,
all are left to wonder whether a more efficient manner of re-
solving the alleged conflict existed. 7 Factoring in these
"risks" for a given year of en banc decision-making on the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, Judge Douglas Ginsburg and his co-
author, Donald Falk, estimated the overall cost of en banc re-
view at approximately the cost of five and one-half normal
panel dispositions. 8 Critics of en banc review have concluded
that the advantage of uniformity attained by en banc review
is outweighed by the institutional costs incurred. 9
15. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 13, at 1019.
16. A study of en banc cases in the District of Columbia Circuit identified at
least one high-profile case in which the parties settled after the circuit court
granted a motion for rehearing en banc. See id. at 1065-66. Litigants certainly
appreciate the risk, so clearly documented by those authors, that en banc review
can result in reversal. In the period reviewed by Ginsburg and Falk, the rever-
sal rate was over 80%. See id. at 1034 n.131. Indeed, Ginsburg and Falk even
document a case in which the mere grant of a petition for en banc review
prompted the original three-judge panel to preempt en banc review by reversing
its own opinion. See id. at 1012 n.32.
17. In fact, in cases where a panel wishes to overrule existing precedent and
the court is demonstrably of one mind on the question, there is a more efficient
way. For those occasions when the court recognizes that en banc review is sim-
ply a practical necessity to change an obsolete or unworkable rule of law or pro-
cedure set down by an earlier case or cases, the "partial en banc" is an option.
As the authors discussed in their previous article, this is a more efficient way of
conducting en banc review. See Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 1, at 794. In that
article, the authors predicted the partial en banc procedure would be a little-
used mechanism. See id. Two recent Federal Circuit opinions, however, force a
revision of that prediction. It appears that the court is particularly willing to
employ the partial en banc in instances where all or nearly all of the judges see
the need to alter a largely procedural rule and will, therefore, simply join in the
portion of the opinion announcing that change. See, e.g., Midwest Indus., Inc. v.
Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nobelpharma
AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
18. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 13, at 1020. These concerns are by no
means exclusive to the District of Columbia Circuit. See, e.g., Lang's Estate v.
Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1938) (expressing concern over the
administrative burdens of en banc hearings).
19. See Stein, supra note 8, at 820, 829-37 nn.73-74 (concluding that the
inefficiency argument is exaggerated).
[Vol. 40794
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B. En Bane Review Can Create Friction on the Federal
Circuit
Judges being human, en banc cases can cause friction be-
tween the judges on the Federal Circuit. No judge wants his
or her opinions subjected to en banc review, and some regard
a colleague's vote for en banc review of one of their cases "as
tantamount to betrayal."20 While judges' regard for their col-
leagues may survive differences on individual cases, the po-
tential for friction-occasioned when proceedings within the
court itself take an adversarial turn-cannot be ignored.
Critics of en banc review have decried the erosion of collegi-
ality among judges participating in such review, and have
raised it as a reason against such review.2
C. En Banc Review Will Not Solve All Problems
Both the authors' previous article and Judge Gajarsa's
speeches highlighted a number of issues that now appear ripe
for en banc review. It may be a mistake, however, to assume
that making some or all of these issues subject to en banc re-
view at the earliest opportunity will cure the problem.
By taking a case en banc, the court does not guarantee a
resolution of all conflicts with precedent. The Supreme Court
always sits en banc, yet its patent law decisions often create
as many conflicts as they resolve.2  Likewise, the Federal
Circuit's predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals ("C.C.P.A."), always sat en banc, and its precedent was
not free from conflict.' Potential conflict always looms, even
for an en banc court.
Furthermore, the limitations with the en banc procedure
are systemic and will not change. En banc review will always
be inefficient and carry the potential for friction. For these
reasons, the Federal Circuit cannot overcome its horror pleni
merely by a more eager embrace of the en banc procedure.
20. Wald, supra note 14, at 488. Of course, not all en bane reviews are nec-
essarily contentious or even controversial.
21. See Stein, supra note 8, at 840-45.
22. A recent example is Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998), where
the Supreme Court created a new standard for the stage of development re-
quired for application of the on sale bar, but in formulating its test appeared to
shift the initial burdens of going forward with evidence related to experimental
use.
23. Because the C.C.P.A. always sat en banc, its latest decision was, and is,
binding. See In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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Similarly, quick resolution of all conflicts in patent law prece-
dent through en banc review is unrealistic. Instead, if both
the bench and bar embrace the partnership proposed by
Judge Gajarsa throughout the appellate process, the resolu-
tion of many conflicts in patent law becomes possible.
III. THE REST OF THE PARTNERSHIP:
DuTIES OF THE BENCH AND BAR
Stare decisis is, simply put, the policy of the courts "[t]o
abide by, or adhere to, decided cases."' Stare decisis applies
only to the holding of a given case, that is, to "legal issues
that were actually decided."' Courts legitimately refuse to be
bound by dicta.26 "[A] dictum is not authoritative. It is the
part of an opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior
court, is free to reject."27 And, of course, stare decisis "deals
only with law, as the facts of each successive case must be de-
termined by the evidence adduced at trial."28
The doctrine of stare decisis holds considerable sway over
the thinking of most American-educated lawyers. As Justice
Cardozo observed: "Stare decisis is at least the everyday
working rule of our law."29 It is not, however, an immutable
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (6th ed. 1991). "Stare decisis" is short for
"stare decisis et non quieta movere" or "stand by the decision and do not disturb
what is settled." Edward D. Re, Stare Decisis, 79 F.R.D. 509, 509 (1975) [here-
inafter Re, Stare Decisis]. "The principle of stare decisis is integral to our juris-
prudence 'because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent de-
velopment of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.' In re
Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quoting Payne v. Tennes-
see, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). "[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare deci-
sis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
25. Beacon Oil Co. v. O'Leary, 71 F.3d 391, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In other
words, "the only part of a previous case that is binding is the ratio decidendi
(reason for deciding)." RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH
LAW 39 (4th ed. 1991).
26. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513
U.S. 18, 24 (1994) ("This seems to us a prime occasion for invoking our custom-
ary refusal to be bound by dicta."). See also CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 25, at
41 ("Dicta in earlier cases are, of course, frequently followed or applied, but
dicta are never more than persuasive authority. There is no question of any
judge being bound to follow them.").
27. In re McGrew, 120 F.3d 1236, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting United
States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988)).
28. Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see
also CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 25, at 222-24.
29. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20
(1921).
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commandment of lawmaking. Indeed, stare decisis is a con-
cept foreign to many other legal systems." Even the courts of
the American common law tradition apply the concept with
varying degrees of fidelity (or rigidity).31 In the United States
Supreme Court, for example, the countervailing consideration
of the need for a court (particularly a court of last resort) to
correct errors or injustices in the law constrains the concept
of stare decisis.32 As Justice Cardozo explained, reconciliation
of the "tendency to subordinate precedent to justice ... with
the need [for] uniformity and certainty, is one of the great
problems confronting the lawyers and judges of our day."
The Federal Circuit has a relatively simple rule of stare
decisis to govern how the court treats its own precedent. Un-
der the Federal Circuit's version of this rule, prior decisions
are binding unless and until overturned by the court en
banc.34 Where precedential decisions of the court conflict, the
30. See Linda Karr O'Connor, International and Foreign Legal Research:
Tips, Tricks, and Sources, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 417, 419 (1995).
Fundamental differences in approach and philosophy exist between
civil law and common law jurisdictions. For example, in many civil
jurisdictions there is no principle of stare decisis. The law flows pri-
marily from civil codes rather than from case law. Consequently, re-
spected commentaries and doctrinal writings about the codes may be
given more weight by practitioners and judges than are cases, even if
on point.
Id.
3L Stare decisis is a "principle of policy," not an "inexorable command," and
courts are not necessarily constrained to follow "unworkable" or "badly rea-
soned" precedent. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996).
While stare decisis in general should be viewed as "policy" and not a "com-
mand," there are contexts in which the policy takes on considerably more
weight. The Supreme Court has observed of its own sometimes sporadic adher-
ence to principles of stare decisis that "[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved." Payne v. United States, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). The
Court has also frequently observed that, in questions of statutory interpreta-
tion, where errors can be remedied by legislative action, there is even less rea-
son to disregard the "policy" of respecting previous decisions. See, e.g., Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). In the jurisprudence of patents, both of
these considerations weigh in favor of the consistent application of stare decisis
principles.
32. Indeed, a recent study suggests that the behavior of Supreme Court jus-
tices is rarely influenced by precedent. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A.
SEGAL, MAJORITY RuLE OR MINORITY WILL 287-315 (1999).
33. CARDOZO, supra note 29, at 160.
34. See Newell Co. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647,
652 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988); Kimberly-Clark
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earlier decision controls." Stare decisis is not self-executing;
its application requires diligent effort on the parts of the both
bench and bar.
A. The Advocate's Obligation to Present Authority Accurately
and Fairly
To persuade a Federal Circuit panel to decide a case dif-
ferently from an earlier, apparently controlling, decision, the
advocate must confront and distinguish that earlier decision."
The advocate must analyze the earlier decision, identify pre-
cisely what was decided (as opposed to information merely
discussed or considered), and then persuade the panel that
the earlier case decided an issue different from the issue pre-
sented by the pending one.37 In some instances, this analysis
requires the advocate to argue to the Federal Circuit panel
that the question decided by an arguably precedential case
was materially different from what the opinion itself claims it
decided, or that the earlier case was postured in a way mate-
rially different from the present case.38
This exercise requires that the advocate distinguish care-
fully between the holding of the prior case and mere dicta.39
Corp. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 772 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Mother's
Restaurant, Inc. v. Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
35. See Newell, 864 F.2d at 765; UMC Elec., 816 F.2d at 652 n.6; Kimberly-
Clark, 772 F.2d at 863; Mother's Restaurant, 723 F.2d at 1573; see also Albert G.
Tramposch, The Dilemma of Conflicting Precedent: Three Options in the Federal
Circuit, 17 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. AsS'N Q.J. 323, 326-27 (1989). This rule has
an exception for the precedent of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
which always sat en banc. The latest C.C.P.A. decision is binding precedent.
See supra note 23. And, of course, conflict assumes that the holdings of the
cases conflict, not just dicta, that is, "statements in judicial opinion upon a point
or points not necessary to the decision of the case." In re McGrew, 120 F.3d
1236, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
36. See Paul Michel, Remarks at the Eleventh Annual Federal Circuit Judi-
cial Conference, in 153 F.R.D. 177, 198 (1993).
37. See generally CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 25, at 39-96 (considering
thoroughly the holding/dicta distinction); Re, Stare Decisis, supra note 24, at
510-14. Given the reluctance of a court to overturn a precedent unnecessarily,
litigants realize that they need not ask the court to do so when they can win if
an objectionable precedent is held inapplicable. See SPAETH & SEGAL, supra
note 32, at 40-41.
38. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 12-13; see also Michel, supra note 36,
at 199.
39. "There is a fundamental difference between a 'decision' and an 'opinion.'
The decision is the egg. The opinion is crowing about it." Howard T. Markey,
Trademarks on Appeal-A View from the Bench, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 279 (1976)
[hereinafter Markey, Trademarks on Appeal].
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The court that decided the earlier question often provides un-
expected help in this task. For example, by articulating al-
ternate grounds for an opinion, a court may render both
grounds "dicta," inasmuch as neither is essential to the out-
come of the case." Thus, regardless of how emphatically a
court states the holding of its case (or what it perceives to be
the holding of its case), another panel or court may label that
"holding" merely dicta at some point in the future.4'
A careful reading of opinions allows the advocate to parse
out real holdings from dicta. Careful reading of this sort
serves the court by giving it an opportunity to advance preci-
sion and clarity in the law. This, in turn, improves the
chances of the court accepting the advocate's argument.
Writing in a recent issue of Litigation magazine, Federal Cir-
cuit Judge Paul Michel outlined his personal views on appel-
late advocacy, touching in part on this very issue." Judge Mi-
chel observed that it is important not to confuse dicta and
holdings, and counseled, "[d]on't separate legal propositions
from supporting authority and rulings from legal context ....
Dicta are not binding; only holdings are."3
By the same token, however, advocates ought not to en-
courage one panel of the Federal Circuit to transmute into
"dicta" the plain holding of a previous panel in the earlier
case. Such mischief undermines certainty in the law and in-
vites en banc reconsideration.
An advocate should also confront authority contrary to
that on which she relies." Pointing out conflicting precedent
interests an appellant more than an appellee, whose interest
40. See Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 1, at 794-95.
41. See, e.g., In re McGrew, 120 F.3d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The court in
McGrew considered the emphatic statement in In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675
(C.C.P.A. 1980), that 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) applies only to interference proceedings
and not to ex parte prosecution. See McGrew, 120 F.3d at 1238. The McGrew
court seized on two sentences in the Sasse opinion addressing the facts of that
case as providing an alternative basis. See id. It then labeled the statement
summarizing almost the entire thrust of the opinion as "dicta." See id. Thus, by
adding additional reasons for its decision, the court effectively undermined
what precedential value the opinion may have had.
42. See Paul R. Michel, Effective Appellate Advocacy, 24 LITIGATION 19
(1998) [hereinafter Michel, Effective Appellate Advocacy].
43. Id. at 21-22.
44. Of course, there is an ethical responsibility to directly confront contrary
precedent, a topic that is beyond the scope of this paper. See Re, Partnership of
Bench and Bar, supra note 5, at 202-04.
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lies in "lying low" and obtaining an affirmance. Both sides,
however, should recognize that relying on dicta, or on only
one line of cases to the exclusion of a conflicting line of cases,
is dangerous. The court may well dismiss an argument based
on dicta or on a single line of cases in favor of authority pre-
sented by the other side. By not addressing the contrary
authority early on, the advocate may lose the opportunity to
do so, together with the appeal.
Judge Michel articulates what he calls the "Ten Com-
mandments of Appellate Advocacy," the first of which is to
"honor precedent."45 Judge Michel explains the primacy of
this "commandment" by pointing out that if an advocate
"cannot articulate a theory of reversible error based on prece-
dent," he or she "probably should not appeal."46 By honoring
precedent, the advocate advances the partnership between
the bench and bar by bringing only meritorious appeals, while
at the same time increasing the chances of succeeding on ap-
peal.
B. The Authoring Judge's Obligation to Treat Precedent
Fairly
Fair treatment of precedent requires identifying the ex-
tent to which the precedent is relevant to the case at bar.47 If
the holding of the earlier case is not distinguishable in a rele-
vant manner from the case before the court, the precedent
controls.4" More frequently, however, the earlier case is not
squarely on point, but rather involves a particular approach
to certain issues, an acceptance of certain premises, or a mode
of analysis that logically applies by extension to the case at
bar.
49
45. Michel, Effective Appellate Advocacy, supra note 42, at 23. See also Paul
R. Michel, Appellate Advocacy-One Judge's Point of View, 1 FED. CiR. B.J. 1, 9
(1991).
46. Michel, Effective Appellate Advocacy, supra note 42, at 23.
47. See generally Re, Stare Decisis, supra note 24, at 510-11.
48. See id. ("If [the precedent] is binding, the principle established in the
prior case must be applied, and determines the disposition of the subsequent
case.").
49. See Wald, supra note 14, at 490. As then Chief Judge Nies explained,
"the language in some opinions may have been overstated and there is frustra-
tion if you're faced with that and you can't reach the result, reasonably or intel-
lectually honestly, that the judges have agreed on." Helen W. Nies, Remarks at
the Tenth Annual Federal Circuit Judicial Conference, in 146 F.R.D. 205, 216
(1993).
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With this type of suggestive, but not directly controlling
precedent, appellate judges select the opinions they agree
with and disregard those they do not agree with. As a result,
precedent may be ignored or distinguished. Over time, this
process results in a sorting or culling of the court's prece-
dent.0 This sorting process favors more current precedent,
while distinguishing, or limiting to its facts, unpopular prece-
dent.51
Precedent that is truly controlling should be followed or
overruled." The latter can be done only by the court sitting
en banc, something the Federal Circuit undertakes reluc-
tantly. Following precedent, however, requires the discipline
to toe the line on prior opinions that clearly dictate the out-
come of the present case.
Former Chief Judge Wald of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit asserts that "[w]hen a judge finds precedent dead set
against the way she thinks the case should go, she usually ac-
cedes to it, albeit reluctantly."53 Experience, however, shows
Judge Wald may be too idealistic. As one commentator noted,
"[clonsiderable anecdotal evidence suggests that when judges
care deeply about a particular legal issue but disagree with
existing precedent, they often attempt to subvert the doctrine
[of stare decisis] and free [themselves] from its fetters by
stretching to distinguish [the precedential authority]. 4
Moreover, as Justice O'Connor frankly observed, judges
"know how to mouth the correct legal rules with ironic solem-
nity while avoiding those rules' logical consequences."55 The
proposed bench and bar partnership requires judges to follow
directly or acknowledge the controlling authority of earlier
decisions, despite any personal disagreement.56
50. See Wald, supra note 14, at 490-91.
5L See id.
52. There is at least one, narrow exception to this rule. A lower court may
have reason to depart from precedent when the failure to do so would mean, as
a practical matter, that an issue of importance would evade high court review.
See Jerome B. Falk Jr., Honest Dissent, LOS ANGELES DAILY J., August 13,
1998, at 6; see also CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 25, at 125-64 (cataloging other
exceptions).
53. Wald, supra note 14, at 481.
54. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 819 (1994).
55. Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
500 (1993)).
56. Critics of en banc review have identified self-disciplined adherence to
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C. The Authoring Judge's Obligation to Limit Dicta
Justice Holmes cautioned that "the proper derivation of
general principles in both common and constitutional law...
arise gradually, in the emergence of a consensus from a mul-
titude of particularized prior decisions." 7 That is, "[the
common law does not work from pre-established truths of
universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from
them deductively[,1" rather, "[i]ts method is inductive, and it
draws its generalizations from particulars."58 Unfortunately,
the Federal Circuit is less than ardent in practicing restraint
in pronouncing new principles of patent law.59
Shortly after Congress created the Federal Circuit, Chief
Judge Howard Markey recognized that the new court "ha[d]
its work cut out for it in achieving that part of its mission
which entails removal from the field of patent law... 'the
high costs of ifs."''6 "Not only the opportunity, but the duty of
clarifying the law of patents itself," he explained, "will require
the resolution of numerous apparent conflicts lurking in past
decisions and decisional approaches of various courts." 1
The Federal Circuit quickly acted to resolve the dozen
patent law conflicts that Chief Judge Markey identified. 2 In
doing so, however, some members of the court developed the
unfortunate habit of writing broadly, expounding on matters
far beyond the facts of the case." In the short term, this
circuit precedent as an alternative to en banc review. See Stein, supra note 8,
at 857 n.256.
57. Frederic R. Kellogg, Law, Morals and Justice Holmes, 69 JUDICATURE
214 (1986). "The law moves brick by brick and broader legal policies evolve
when a large number of bricks are viewed together." Andewelt et al., supra note
8, at 381.
58. CARDOZO, supra note 29, at 22-23.
59. At the extreme end of the spectrum is the patent opinion that reads like
a law clerk thesis. Cf BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE SUPREME
COURT DECIDES CASES 260 (1996) (criticizing the Supreme Court Justices' "vir-
tual abdication of what many consider the Justices' most important function-
that of explaining their decisions to the profession and the public").
60. Howard T. Markey, The Phoenix Court, 10 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J. 227,
231 (1982).
61. Id. at 232.
62. See Melvin Halpern, The Office of the Senior Technical Assistant, in THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY
(1982-1990), at 181 (United States Judicial Conference 1991).
63. To be fair, there were and are members of the court that avoid dicta
scrupulously. The late Circuit Judge Jean Galloway Bissell is an example.
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"maximalist"6 approach fulfilled what Chief Judge Markey
believed was the Federal Circuit's obligation to "illuminate a
clear and consistent course capable of being followed with
ease and assurance by its trial tribunals and its bar."5 In the
long term, however, this approach made it much more diffi-
cult for the court to satisfy the need that Chief Judge Markey
recognized "for maintenance of stare decisis wherever possi-
ble."6
The Federal Circuit does not enjoy the advantage of the
Supreme Court, which allows issues to percolate through the
various circuits, each serving as a proving ground for differ-
ent ideas and approaches to the law. Because cases come to
the Federal Circuit straight from the harried and overworked
district courts, many of which lack particularized expertise in
patent law, they seldom include the comprehensive state-
ments of fact and law usually available to the Supreme
Court.67 For this reason, it is perilous for the Federal Circuit
to announce bright line rules or offer sweeping statements in-
tended for general application.' Opinions that stray far from
the particular facts presented are vulnerable to contradiction
by cases involving a set of facts, not foreseen by the panel
authoring the earlier opinion, that demand a contrary out-
64. Professor Cass Sunstein defines a "maximalist" as one who seeks "to de-
cide cases in a way that sets broad rules for the future and that also gives ambi-
tious theoretical justifications for outcomes." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 9-10 (1999). While many
Federal Circuit patent opinions smack of maximalism in that they are "wide-
they decide more than the case at hand-they may also be viewed as "shallow"
in that they reach incompletely theorized agreements, a hallmark of
minimalism. See id. at 10-11.
65. Markey, Trademarks on Appeal, supra note 39, at 235.
66. Id.
67. See Laura M. Burson, AC. Aukerman and the Federal Circuit: What is
the Standard of Review for a Summary Judgment Ruling on Laches or Equita-
ble Estoppel?, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 799, 830 (1999).
68. Judge Roger Andewelt of the Court of Federal Claims cautioned the
Federal Circuit early on regarding "the thirst for principles and certainty and
bright lines":
When Federal Circuit judges take a look at lower court decisions, they
have the briefs of each of the parties before them. This gives the court
a very, very narrow focus on the policy issues impacted. It's true as a
court and as an individual sitting on the court, you develop some exper-
tise over a period of time. But how confident can you really be that you
understand what's going on out there in the economic community? Do
you really understand the ramifications of the bright lines that you
create, what's left inside and what's left outside of those lines?
Andewelt et al., supra note 8, at 381.
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come.
This vulnerability of decisions suggests the need to turn
away from the "maximalist" approach to opinion writing. In
addition to reducing the opportunities for judicial errors and
the need to override precedent, decisional "minimalism" likely
reduces the burdens of judicial decisions.69 The court that re-
alizes that changes in the law occur, to quote Justice Cardozo,
"inch by inch,"0 may take comfort that it discharges its obli-
gation by "nudging the law slightly in one direction or an-
other,"7' but only as far as is necessary to decide the case at
bar. Although these changes may not seem "momentous in
the making,"" a court deciding cases in this incremental
manner may find that the effect of such decisions "has been
not merely to supplement or modify; it has been to revolu-
tionize and transform."73
Clearly, the use of dicta is the enemy of minimalism. In
some cases, it may also be "against the rules." The "rules" in
this case are the Federal Circuit's own internal operating pro-
cedures, and one of these rules specifically instructs that "all
opinions and orders shall be as short and as limited to the
dispositive issue as the nature of the cases or motions will
allow."74 By minimizing dicta, which is by definition unneces-
sary to the given issue, the bench aids in achieving the aims
of the bench and bar partnership.75
69. SUNSTEIN, supra note 64, at 4. Professor Sunstein defines "decisional
minimalism" as "saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and
leaving as much as possible undecided." Id. at 3.
70. CARDOZO, supra note 29, at 25.
71. James C. Schroeder & Robert M. Dow, Jr., Arguing for Changes in the
Law, 25 LITIGATION 37, 37 (1999).
72. CARDOZO, supra note 29, at 27.
73. Id. at 27-28.
74. FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 9(4). Accord Howard T. Markey,
Remarks at the Second Annual Federal Circuit Judicial Conference, in 104
F.R.D. 207, 243 (1984) ("Opinions must distill the facts to their operative mini-
mum and limit discussion of the law to that necessary for resolving the issues
presented.") [hereinafter Markey, Remarks].
75. "The nature of the beast is that courts decide the issues before them and
shouldn't reach out to resolve uncertainties which needn't be resolved to the
case." Andewelt et al., supra note 8, at 382. By this proposal, this article urges
the court to adopt new rules with great care, not to resort as a matter of course
to a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, an approach for which the court
has been criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Thomas K Landry, Certainty
and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, the Doctrine of Equivalents,
and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1994). Ad-
ditionally, at least one judge of the court itself has criticized the court's ap-
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D. The Other Panel Judges' Obligation to Review the Draft
Panel Opinion
The internal operating procedures of the Federal Circuit
reveal additional opportunities for judges to exercise care in
shepherding an opinion through the decision-making process,
thereby ensuring that the opinion adds to the overall reli-
ability and predictability of the law.76 First, it is important to
note that the two non-authoring judges on a panel must vote
on the decision before it becomes the decision of the panel. To
advance the ends of consistency in the law, the two non-
authoring judges should not confine their review to the out-
come, but rather should also review the reasoning of the
opinion. This review of the draft panel opinion should pay
particular attention to Federal Circuit precedent.
The non-authoring panel judges' opportunity to review
the draft opinion is important.
The enlistment of more memories, of more individuals' re-
called experience, cannot help but produce more lines of
guidance as well as more threads to be tied in: the enlist-
ment of more imaginations and more individuals' projec-
tions of possibility and likelihood cannot help but call
forth a more serviceable advance exploration of the pro-
spective bearings of the announced reason and rule.77
Despite its advantages, multi-judge reviews are not al-
ways fully effective. Because of "pride of opinion, or bother
about offending such pride, or weird views about manners or
delicacy, [panel judges may be reluctant to make] any sug-
gested change of wording, thought, or even of citation."78
While by no means universal, 9 such reluctance to suggest
proach. See An Interview With Circuit Judge Randall R. Rader, 7 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 2 (1995). Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal
Circuit's "totality of the circumstances" test for application of the on sale bar
because it "seriously undermines the interest in certainty." Pfaffv. Wells Elec.,
Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1998).
76. An electronic copy of the court's Internal Operating Procedures is avail-
able on the Internet at <http'//www.fedcir.gov>.
77. LLEWELLYN, supra note 11, at 314.
78. Id.
79. It may sometimes be easier to convince a full appeals court to take a
case en banc than it is to win a motion for reconsideration before the panel that
handed down the objectionable opinion in the first instance. See David Giles &
Bruce Brown, Rehearing Motions: The Switch of Minds That Saved The Times,
25 LITIGATION 50, 65 (1999). To win reconsideration, Giles and Brown ob-
served, "you have to persuade a panel of three that it was wrong," whereas to
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changes to the opinions of another judge "raises tremendously
the likelihood of discontinuity among a court's results over
the years."0 For this reason, the non-authoring panel judges'
opportunity to review and comment upon the author's draft
opinion is not only an obligation, but it is essential for pro-
ducing clear, consistent opinions.
If a non-authoring panel member identifies a conflict, he
or she should informally attempt to persuade the authoring
judge to revise the opinion to avoid the conflict." There are
times, however, when the panel members simply disagree,
and the authoring judge will refuse to revise his or her opin-
ion to avoid the conflict perceived by a non-authoring judge.
If the non-authoring judge cannot dissuade the third panel
member from joining the draft opinion, the stage is set for an
invitational dissent." Instead of making law, the invitational
dissent makes the case for a change in the law.' This form of
dissent is an invitation to change the law or to resolve a con-
flict created or perpetuated by the panel opinion. The invita-
tional dissenter writes not to the panel or to the bar, but to
the non-panel judges of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme
Court, and Congress.' Invitational dissents play a legiti-
mate, and oft-times effective, role in identifying conflicts in
precedent that are capable of resolution only by the Federal
Circuit en banc, the Supreme Court, or Congress."
have a case taken en banc, "you have to persuade other judges on the court only
that their colleagues were wrong." Id. Indeed, Giles and Brown point out that
in some courts, ideological divisions may make one faction eager to overturn
particular panels' opinions. See id.
80. Id.
81. Withholding a vote or threatening a dissent may pressure the authoring
judge to revise the draft opinion, if only to avoid the "enormous amount of time
[that] may be consumed as draft panel opinions and dissents shuttle back and
forth among the panelists." Wald, supra note 14, at 503.
82. See id. at 493-95.
83. The separate opinion "guarantees a new perspective and lends, as it
were, a depth dimension to decisions," and "paves the way for new develop-
ments in the law." LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 52, 56. The dissent has the
added value of guaranteeing "the public that any bending of the law will see the
light of day" and "that judges are on the job, that in the chambers where a
judge's deliberations take place, judges join battle over the law, each judge
feeling individually responsible for the panel's decisions." Id. at 59.
84. See Wald, supra note 14, at 493.
85. Of course, this type of dissent must not be abused, so that the dissent
serves merely to weaken the majority opinion and confuse future readers. "[Ilt's
extremely important that the judges at the Federal Circuit understand the need
for harmony. Split decisions, inconsistent decisions create real problems." Av-
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E. The Non-Panel Judges' and Senior Technical Assistant's
Obligation to Review Circulating Opinions
The structure of the Federal Circuit, with its twelve ac-
tive judges, senior judges, and visiting judges sitting in pan-
els of three, can result in what Karl Llewellyn called "ap-
pallingly different courts." Structurally, the Federal Circuit
has taken two steps to insure respect for both its rules con-
cerning precedent and its integrity as a single court. First,
the Federal Circuit instituted the practice of circulating the
decisions of each panel to each judge on the court before pub-
lishing the decisions." For the same reasons that the non-
authoring judges' input to the authoring judge is important,
the non-panel judges' suggestions to the panel are vital."
Unlike the panel judges, however, non-panel judges must re-
quest the decision below, briefs, and appendixes."
Second, and perhaps as important, the Federal Circuit
created the post of Senior Technical Assistant." The duties of
ern Cohn, Remarks at the Tenth Annual Federal Circuit Judicial Conference, in
146 F.R.D. 205, 372 (1992).
86. LLEWELLYN, supra note 11, at 251.
87. See Halpern, supra note 62, at 182. See also Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Con-
flicts and the Federal Circuit, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 835, 836 (1996). Then-
Chief Judge Archer stated, "We take this circulation period very seriously. A
substantial number of opinions bring about comments, both technical and sub-
stantive, from one, or more often, several judges." Id.
88. If non-authoring judges' input is ignored, rehearing may result. Any
time an advocate files a petition for rehearing en banc, that petition is circu-
lated to each of the active judges, any of whom may ask for a response from the
opposing party. See FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 14(2). Responses, when
sought and received, are likewise circulated and any active judge may, at that
time, ask that the court be polled to determine whether a majority of the active
judges wish to rehear the case en banc. See id. Judges who disagree with a
panel opinion may even seek to have the court rehear the matter en banc sua
sponte, without a petition for rehearing en banc. See id. 14(3).
89. Litigants are required to file only twelve copies of their briefs and sup-
porting materials. See FED. CIR. RULE 31. Of these, two copies of the "briefs,
records and other case related materials" are circulated to each judge of the
merits panel (that is, the panel hearing the merits of a case). FED. CIR.
INTERNAL OPERATING P. 3. The fact that a non-merits-panel judge must make
the effort to contact the clerls office and request one of the remaining six sets of
briefs exemplifies the practical obstacles that face a judge who wishes to grapple
in any depth with the issues raised by a case before another panel.
90. See Halpern, supra note 62, at 182. Writing in a 1991 history of the
Federal Circuit, Senior Technical Assistant ("STA") Halpern opined:
Probably the most important aspect of the STA's office has been its par-
ticipation in the court's process of trying to avoid conflict and confusion
in published opinion. After a panel approves the author's opinion, but
before it is published, the opinion is circulated for comments by the re-
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the Senior Technical Assistant include reviewing draft opin-
ions for conflict with Federal Circuit precedent and calling
such conflicts to the court's attention before the cases are
published.9
These procedural and structural mechanisms should en-
sure that new decisions by three-judge panels follow prece-
dent and recognize those decisions that would conflict with
the court's stare decisis principles. The Federal Circuit may
then modify or consider en banc those decisions identified as
conflicting with precedent. In other words, these procedures
should allow the court to "speak convincingly and with one
voice on those issues of law within its exclusive jurisdiction."3
F. The Authoring Judge's Obligation to Heed Concerns
Expressed Before Publication
With each step forward in the process of rendering a final
decision on appeal, the stakes rise: authoring judges, in par-
ticular, become more identified with the position they sup-
port. After the panel has drafted its opinion, the rest of the
court becomes a group of potential critics of the opinion. Al-
though the remainder of the court is greater in number than
the panel, it is probably proceeding with less information, and
certainly with less familiarity with the details of the case,
than the authoring judge. While the inertia is high by this
maining judges and the STA's office on any arguable inconsistencies or
confusion with prior published opinions. The author and panel can
then consider those comments to see if they agree with them and if a
change in the opinion is needed.
Id. While the Federal Circuit may be unique in charging a particular court staff
member with the task of monitoring for possible conflicts in precedent, at least
some of the other circuit courts of appeals (the District of Columbia, Third,
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits) follow the practice of circulating all of their opinions
to the full court before issuing them. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 13, at
1012 n.29. This has also been the practice among the judges of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, at least in 1991-1992, when one of the authors clerked for a judge of that
court. See supra note *.
91. See Halpern, supra note 62, at 182.
92. One theory is that if these procedures cannot keep the law uniform,
"nothing can." Giles S. Rich, My Favorite Things, 35 IDEA 1, 11 (1994). The
authors recent article pointed out a number of instances in which practice has
fallen well short of theory and suggested reasons why this might be so. See gen-
erally Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 1. It seems likely that these conflicts can
arise when judges ignore the efforts of the Senior Technical Assistant.
93. William Rehnquist, Remarks at the Eleventh Annual Federal Circuit
Judicial Conference, in 153 F.R.D. 177, 182 (1993).
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step in the process, the cost of failing to correct a mistake,
failing to adhere to stare decisis principles, or taking the
question en banc for decision by the entire court, can be even
greater. For this reason, the authoring judge must view her-
self as being under an obligation to consider the views of
other judges before releasing an opinion for publication. Fur-
ther, the Senior Technical Assistant should have a particu-
larly strong voice at this stage in the review process. If the
court provides the Senior Technical Assistant with the neces-
sary resources to perform his job and trusts him to accurately
perform that job, then the Senior Technical Assistant's identi-
fication of a potential conflict should call the entire court to
reexamine the opinion.
G. The Advocate's Obligation to Focus on the Conflict
Created or Perpetuated by a Panel Opinion in the Petition
for Rehearing
In his series of California speeches,94 Judge Gajarsa ex-
plained that a Federal Circuit panel is unlikely to grant a pe-
tition for rehearing based on the argument that the panel
erred in view of the facts of the specific case. In a petition for
rehearing before the panel, the panel judges view such an ar-
gument as asking the panel to grind the same corn a second
time. If an advocate points out that the panel opinion creates
or perpetuates a conflict, however, the panel is more likely to
grant the rehearing.
H. The Panel Judges' Obligation to Consider Conflicts
Identified in the Petition for Rehearing
Given the considerable lengths to which the court must
go in order to consider a suggestion for hearing en banc,95 the
panel should carefully consider the points made in a petition
for panel rehearing.96
A petition for rehearing that identifies a conflict created
by the decision should spur the panel judges to find another
avenue so as to avoid the conflict. The relatively few petitions
for rehearing that are granted should not dissuade the panel
94. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
96. See Markey, Trademarks on Appeal, supra note 39, at 281 ("[W]e give
just as thorough consideration to a petition for rehearing as we do the original
briefs.").
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members from considering such petitions carefully. "The rea-
son so few petitions are granted is not because we do not pay
close attention to them," the judges say, but "because we ex-
hausted all avenues to decision the first time around."97 By
clarifying its opinion, or otherwise assuaging legitimate con-
cerns raised in the petition for panel rehearing, the panel
saves the entire court a lot of work.
The panel judges not authoring the opinion have a par-
ticular obligation to carefully consider the conflicts identified
in petitions for rehearing. Even judges that dissent from the
original panel opinion should consider these conflicts. Most
judges dissenting from a panel opinion are "content to rein-
force their original panel dissent with a symbolic vote for re-
hearing by the panel, and to ration their [en banc] votes care-
fully.""8 Recognizing that a denial of en banc rehearing only
strengthens the authority of the majority opinion, some
judges accompany their vote for panel rehearing with state-
ments of their reasons." Although these statements have no
more precedential effect than a dissent or concurrence, they
address an audience perhaps more receptive than the Federal
Circuit, such as the Supreme Court or Congress. °0 These
statements also contribute to the ongoing dialogue in secon-
dary literature, a dialog that may bring additional pressure
on the circuit to resolve the conflict created or perpetuated by
the majority opinion."'
The statements of dissenting panel members can, how-
ever, be costly. "Broadside attacks on existing precedents...
tend to highlight doctrinal and ideological splits in the court
and invite cynical observations from litigants and commenta-
tors about different law emanating from different panels." 2
For this reason, attempting to obtain en banc review is pre-
ferred over merely criticizing the majority opinion in a dis-
senting opinion or a dissent from the denial of rehearing."'
97. Id.
98. Wald, supra note 14, at 483.
99. See id. at 483.
100. See id. at 484.
101 See id. at 485. While the relative paucity of citations to secondary lit-
erature in Federal Circuit patent opinions suggests that this pressure may not
amount to much, several Federal Circuit judges have commented publicly that
they appreciate and read secondary literature.
102. Id. See also Cohn, supra note 85.
103. See Wald, supra note 14, at 485. If the attempt to obtain en banc review
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The grant of a petition for rehearing does not necessarily
portend a reversal of the original outcome. Past Federal Cir-
cuit cases demonstrate that the court may grant a petition "to
the extent of considering and disposing of the arguments
there presented," thereby adhering to its original result.'
The Federal Circuit has also granted rehearing, heard oral
argument, and then adhered to the original outcome.' These
efforts by the panel to ensure consideration of all the argu-
ments cannot be anything but salutary.
I. The Advocate's Obligation to Focus on the Conflict
Created or Perpetuated by a Panel Opinion in the Petition
for En Banc Review
The court considers as valid bases for seeking en banc
consideration "a demonstrated conflict with Supreme Court or
Federal Circuit precedent, or the case must be of exceptional
importance."1 6 Conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and
cases of exceptional importance are few and far between. The
advocate should, therefore, focus a petition for en banc review
on the intra-circuit conflict created or perpetuated by the
panel opinion. By doing so, the advocate maximizes the po-
tential for achieving the desired outcome for the client and
serves the court by giving it one final opportunity to address
real conflicts of law en banc.
10 7
J. The Court's Obligation to Address Real Conflicts En Banc
As Judge Gajarsa explains, arguing in a petition for re-
hearing en banc that the original panel was incorrect carries
little weight with the full circuit. At this stage of the pro-
ceedings, the court is looking for opportunities to clarify the
is successful, "the circuit jurisprudence is cleared of the underbrush of discred-
ited precedents," and if the attempt is unsuccessful, "the precedent will have
been rehabilitated at least for the moment." Id.
104. United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 577 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991).
105. See Bosco v. United States, 976 F.2d 710, 711 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
106. Glenn L. Archer, Remarks at the Fourteenth Annual Federal Circuit
Judicial Conference, in 170 F.R.D. 534, 541 (1996). The en banc procedure is
spelled out in detail in FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 14.
107. Rearguing the merits in a petition for en banc consideration is "quite
wasteful of the court's time" because the petitions "get circulated to all the
Judges, and each Judge must take time to read the request." Archer, supra
note 106, at 541.
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law and make it more uniform, rather than ensuring that it
decided a particular case correctly."8 The Federal Circuit's
internal operating procedures emphasize this role of en banc
review, considering it appropriate for
(1) [the] necessity of securing or maintaining uniformity of
decisions; (2) involvement of a question of exceptional im-
portance; (3) [the] necessity of overruling a prior holding of
this or a predecessor court expressed in an opinion having
precedential status; or (4) the initiation, continuation, or
resolution of a conflict with another circuit." 9
Due to the Federal Circuit's heavy patent caseload, intra-
circuit conflicts loom large on this list.
As a result of the inordinate resources consumed by the
en banc review of a case, such review "is not undertaken
lightly; the initiating judge must feel deeply that circuit ju-
risprudence is significantly threatened to call for [en banc re-
view]."" The Federal Circuit provides en banc review rela-
tively infrequently, publishing only twenty-five en banc
opinions in patent cases in its history: one in 1982,111 none in
1983, two in 1984,112 four in 1985,13 none in 1986, two in
1987,"4 two in 1988,5 one in 1989,116 three in 1990,"' none in
108. See Gajarsa, supra note 3.
109. FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 13(2).
110. Wald, supra note 14, at 483.
111. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (Fed-
eral Circuit adopted Court of Claims and C.C.P.A. precedents).
112. See Atari Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(holding that the Federal Circuit retains jurisdiction on non-patent issues);
Gardner v. TEC Sys., Inc., 725 F.2d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (establishing standard
of review for obviousness finding).
113. See In re Bennett, 766 F.2d 524 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (broadening reissue ap-
plication requirements); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that
claims in reexamination do not enjoy presumption of validity); Paulik v. Riz-
kalla, 760 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (clarifying rules for determining priority of
invention); SRI Intl v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding that a factual issue concerning reverse doctrine of equivalents pre-
cludes summary judgment).
114. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (clarifying rules governing doctrine of equivalents); Woodard v. Sage
Prod., Inc., 818 F.2d 841 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing appeal of interlocutory or-
ders under section 1292(a)(1)).
115. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (addressing the standard of review for an inequitable conduct
issue); In re Roberts, 846 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (concluding that the Fed-
eral Circuit will not issue mandate in conflict with that of another circuit in the
same case).
116. See Racing Strollers Inc. v. TRI Indus., Inc., 878 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir.
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1991, one in 1992,118 none in 1993, two in 1994,"' three in
1995,"' none in 1996 or 1997, three in 1998,1"1 and one in
1999.122
Notwithstanding the relative infrequency of en banc re-
view, the Federal Circuit judges realize that they have the
last word in many instances, thus they "take a very hard
look" at en banc petitions." "[T]he man or judge who is
stirred out of being a sleeping dog comes awake with a growl
and a mission."124 Judge Gajarsa indicated that there might
be a new resolve in the Federal Circuit to be more aggressive
in averting (or defusing) threats to the circuit's jurispru-
dence.1" The court may be moving toward a greater apprecia-
tion that en banc review "is a sign of a healthy court," and
1989) (holding that a design patent application receives filing date of utility ap-
plication).
117. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing rules govern-
ing obviousness determination in case of chemical compounds and composi-
tions); Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 899
F.2d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (clarifying damages for patent infringement); Aero-
jet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (clari-
fying damages for patent infringement).
118. See KC. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (discussing laches and equitable estoppel in infringement actions).
119. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (clarifying rules of pat-
entability under section 101); In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(interpreting means-plus-fumction language in patent claim).
120. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512
(Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (clarifying rules governing doctrine of
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel); Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (ruling claim
construction to be a question of law); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (clarifying damages for patent infringement).
121. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (applying clearly errone-
ous standard in review of fact-finding by Patent Office); Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the Federal Circuit re-
views claim construction de novo); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations,
Inc., 129 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that Federal Circuit law gov-
erns patent misconduct under antitrust laws).
122. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (holding that the Federal Circuit will apply Federal Circuit law in
determining whether patent law conflicts with other federal statutes or pre-
empts state law causes of action). In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the court en banc identified five
issues on the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel for further briefing, pres-
aging a likely future en banc decision.
123. Markey, Remarks, supra note 74, at 211.
124. LLEWELLYN, supra note 11, at 252.
125. The court's recent order in Festo suggests that Judge Gajarsa's may, in
fact, be correct. See Festo, 187 F.3d at 1381.
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demonstrates that the court "will respond to difficult legal is-
sues, including reexamining precedent, where appropriate, to
correct possible deviations.""8
With this new appreciation of en banc review, the advo-
cate should not shrink from seeking it in proper cases. Where
a conflict clearly exists, neither the statistics concerning how
few en banc petitions are granted, nor the court's traditional
horror pleni should dissuade the advocate from seeking en
banc review. Seeking review strengthens the hand of the
judges on the Federal Circuit who share a common view of
the conflict in precedent and are committed to addressing and
resolving such conflicts.
K. The Advocate's Obligation to Focus on Intra-Circuit
Conflicts in the Petition for Certiorari
If the advocate is unsuccessful in persuading the Federal
Circuit to resolve the conflict created or perpetuated by the
decision, he or she may turn to the Supreme Court. At this
juncture, the Federal Circuit's opinion itself may affect the
potential for the grant of certiorari. The Supreme Court re-
lies heavily on lower court judges to "frame vital issues,
document the need for their resolution or clarification, and
develop rationales to justify one solution or reform over an-
other."'27 The opinions in the courts below set the terms of
debate for the Supreme Court, as well as the structure of ar-
guments for counsel.' For this reason, it is important for the
Federal Circuit to address the conflict in precedent.
Supreme Court review is the exception rather than the
rule.'29 The Court grants petitions for certiorari "only for
compelling reasons," and rarely "when the asserted error con-
sists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a
126. Glenn L. Archer, Introduction, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2109, 2111 (1995).
127. Wald, supra note 14, at 505.
128. See id.
129. During the early years of the Federal Circuit's patent jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on issues of substantive patent law only very
rarely. However, the Supreme Court has taken at least one patent case in each
of the last three years of the 1990s, "[a]nd increasingly the cases are on matters
of core significance to patent law, not simply jurisdictional questions or cases
interpreting special statutory exemptions." Donald S. Chisum, Nies Memorial
Lecture: The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning Lead To
Thin Law?, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999).
[Vol. 40814
20001 RESOLUTION OF PATENT CONFLICTS
properly stated rule of law."13 Indeed, the Court limits its
reasons for granting certiorari on appeals from the Federal
Circuit in patent cases to: (1) decisions in conflict with a deci-
sion of another federal circuit court on the same important
matter; (2) decisions where the court departed so far from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to re-
quire an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory power;
(3) decisions on an important question of federal law that has
not been, but should be, decided by the Supreme Court; and
(4) decisions resolving an important federal question in a way
that conflicts with relevant decisions of the Supreme Court.'
None of these reasons provides a basis for the Court to review
a decision merely because of a split in the Federal Circuit's
case law, even though the Federal Circuit has exclusive juris-
diction over appeals in patent cases. This is so because the
Supreme Court views it as "primarily the task of a court of
appeals to reconcile its internal difficulties."'
There is another reason that the Federal Circuit serves
as the "court of last resort" in most patent cases."' Congress
gave the Federal Circuit the task of ironing out the inconsis-
tencies in patent law, and during the first dozen or so years of
the Federal Circuit's existence, the Supreme Court was very
deferential to the new court's substantive patent law deci-
sions."' While the Supreme Court has reviewed Federal Cir-
cuit decisions in a number of patent cases,"6 only three dealt
130. SUP. CT. R. 10.
13L See id.
132. See 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(1) (1999).
133. Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957).
134. Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41
Ahl. U. L. REV. 577 (1992); see also Michael Paul Chu, Note, An Antitrust Solu-
tion to the New Wave of Predatory Patent Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1341, 1351 (1992) ("[The Federal Circuit is effectively the court of
last resort for patent appeals because very few patent cases reach the Supreme
Court.").
135. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 1823 (1999) ("[W]hen a Federal
Circuit judge reviews PTO factfinding; he or she often will examine that finding
through a lens of patent-related experience-and properly so, for the Federal
Circuit is a specialized court."); Rehnquist, supra note 93, at 184 ("ITihe Federal
Circuit... has made good progress in its aspiration to combine careful deci-
sionmaking with a willingness to correct its own error in order to produce a sub-
stantial and consistent body of jurisprudence, which should rarely require Su-
preme Court review."); see also Allan N. Litman, Restoring the Balance of Our
Patent System, 37 IDEA 545, 565 (1997).
136. See Dickinson, 119 S. Ct. 1816; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370 (1996); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Intl, Inc., 508 U.S. 83
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with substantive patent law issues."7 Further, in none of the
substantive patent law cases did the Supreme Court base its
review on a conflict in the precedent of the Federal Circuit or
its predecessor courts. In only one of these three cases was
the Federal Circuit badly and publicly split over the issue.
With patent law conflicts becoming more apparent and nu-
merous, and as advocates focus more on those conflicts in
their petitions for certiorari, expect the Supreme Court to be
less deferential to the Federal Circuit and its patent-
lawmaking role.
Both advocates and judges agree that the Supreme Court
is not particularly well suited to resolve thorny issues of sub-
stantive patent law.1 9 The threat of expanded Supreme
Court intervention in development of the patent law may be
(1993); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988); Den-
nison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
137. See Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Eli Lilly Co. v. Medronic, Inc.,
496 U.S. 661 (1990). Arguably, Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179
(1995), a Plant Variety Protection Act case, is a fourth such case.
138. In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512
(Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997), Judges Plager, Archer, Rich, Lourie,
and Nies dissented, while Judge Newman added a concurring opinion. Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics, Inc., 124 F.3d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997), affd, 525 U.S. 55 (1998),
bore no panel dissents, and the dissents and concurrences in other on sale bar
cases involving the required extent of development were largely confined to how
the Federal Circuit's "substantially complete" standard was to be applied,
rather than a challenge to that standard itself. See also Continental Plastic
Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., 141 F.3d 1073, 1081 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Newman, J., dissenting).
139. See William C. Conner, Speech at the Seventy Fifth Annual Dinner of
the New York Intellectual Property Law Association, in 6 FED. CiR. B.J. 363,
363 (1997) ("A number of federal judges, with an endearing excess of modesty,
have professed to me that they know little or nothing of patent law. Actually
the only difference between them and the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court is
that the Justices don't admit it."); see also Paul E. Schaafsma, High Court Dis-
playing Patent Mistrust, NATL L.J., May 24, 1999, at C13 ("IT]he Supreme
Court's emerging lack of trust of the Federal Circuit could inject new uncer-
tainty into issues the patent bar believes are settled."). One commentator, how-
ever, implores the Supreme Court "to wake from its slumber and realize that
patent law deserves its attention." Landry, supra note 75, at 1214. He does so
out of his belief that the Federal Circuit is usurping power from the district
courts by eschewing rules in favor of a "totality of the circumstances" approach.
See id. One speculation, with the benefit of hindsight, is that the Court granted
certiorari in Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 55, for that very reason. However, the Court
stated that it granted certiorari in that case to resolve a split of authority in-
volving 20-year old decisions of the Second and Seventh Circuits, a representa-
tion that has raised more than a few eyebrows in the patent bar. See Schaaf-
sma, supra, at C15.
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the keenest incentive for the Federal Circuit, and advocates
before it, to work to minimize intra-circuit conflicts. The re-
sult leaves patent law in an unenviable position, caught be-
tween the Scylla of a fractious and conflict-riddled Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Charybdis of a Supreme
Court lacking sophistication in the nuances of patent law.
This consideration underscores the longer-range importance
of the bench and bar partnership proposed by Judge Gajarsa
and elaborated on by this article.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judge Gajarsa's assertion that the bench and bar need to
work together to resolve conflicts in the Federal Circuit's pat-
ent law is doubtlessly correct. But that partnership cannot be
limited to the en banc review process. If only because of the
Federal Circuit's legitimate reluctance to grant en banc re-
view-its "horror pleni"-the partnership needs to start at
the beginning of the appellate process and continue to the
very end. Both the bench and bar need to confront the court's
patent precedent and treat it with respect. At the same time,
slavish adherence to past decisions does not serve the bench,
the bar, or the public.' The challenge is to identify cases
that require a departure from precedent and overrule them in
a straightforward and proper manner. Only through the
careful application of the principles of stare decisis can the
bench and bar resolve the conflicts in the Federal Circuit's
patent case law.
140. As Justice Frankfurter observed over half a century ago, "[w]isdom too
often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes
late." Henslee v. Union Planters Natl Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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